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SOVEREIGNTY IN JERUSALEM
John Quigley*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the government
of Israel approach negotiations about the status of Jerusalem,1 various
possible outcomes are being proposed in an effort to accommodate the
aims of the two parties. Many of these proposals for Jerusalem have
merit and may ultimately be reflected on the ground.2 The difficulty in
devising an appropriate status for Jerusalem is that two different peoples
claim it as their capital. This Article seeks not to propose a particular
outcome, but rather to examine the two claims.
Competing claims to territory are often difficult to unravel, but certain
principles have developed in the international community. When Spain
withdrew from its colony of Spanish Sahara in northern Africa, two
neighboring states claimed sovereignty, and the population of the terri-
tory rejected both claims. The United Nations General Assembly, seek-
ing to facilitate a peaceful resolution of this tripartite contest, turned to
the International Court of Justice, asking it for an advisory opinion on the
matter. In approaching the conflict, the court focused on acts of occupa-
tion and the principle of self-determination of peoples.3 Sovereignty be-
ing contested, the court asked which people, if any, was in occupation,
and whether a competing claimant could be said to violate the right to
sovereignty of that people.
The fate of Jerusalem, to be sure, is not likely to be the subject of a
judicial tribunal's consideration. A resolution that is in accord with gen-
erally accepted principles, however, holds greater prospects of enduring
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University.
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1993) (agreement
between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization to commence, in 1996, negotiations
on "[p]ermanent status" issues, including Jerusalem).
2. See, e.g., Ruth Lapidoth,.Jerusalem and the Peace Process, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 402
(1994) (suggesting that notions of split or "functional" sovereignty may lead to an appro-
priate settlement).
3. Advisory Opinion No. 61, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33, 40-42, 68 (Oct.
16).
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than one based on the expediency of the moment. While the strength of
the two claims will not necessarily determine the outcome of the negotia-
tions, it does provide an indication of what the parties may reasonably
expect and which outcomes they may justifiably find unacceptable.
The two parties, their respective constituencies, and the international
community are more likely to accept a resolution based on sound princi-
ple. The international community is a relevant actor because the United
Nations, through its Security Council, has been accorded both the power
and the obligation to deal with threats to the international peace. 4 Thus,
if a solution is achieved but is later threatened, the Security Council may
have to step into the breach, and in so doing it may well consider legal
entitlement. 5
It is, indeed, one of the achievements of the twentieth century, albeit
an achievement not uniformly realized in practice, that matters relating to
sovereignty over territory should be resolved in accordance with the
rights of the states and populations involved. A concept premised on the
consent of the governed has replaced the nineteenth century concept that
a state physically able to subjugate a foreign people was within its rights
to do so. A concomitant principle that has emerged holds that territory is
not to be taken by force, and if that occurs, the resulting situation is to be
deemed unlawful and is to be reversed rather than recognized.6
II. ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO JERUSALEM
Israel claims sovereignty over the territory it has controlled since it de-
clared statehood in 1948. That claim covers the western sector of Jerusa-
lem.7 Israel also claims sovereignty over the eastern sector of Jerusalem,
which it has held since 1967. Israel has not, however, stated the basis for
its claims with respect to either sector of Jerusalem. In attempting to
determine how Israel might rationalize its claim to Jerusalem, one might
seek guidance in the basis for its claim to sovereignty in its other terri-
tory. However, Israel's primary basis for claiming sovereignty to territory
is not relevant regarding Jerusalem.
4. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
5. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990) (taking action against Iraq after Security Council decided that it was legally respon-
sible for the hostilities in Kuwait).
6. See S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1421st mtg. at 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/
Rev.1 (1968) (condemning Israeli measures affecting Jerusalem as tantamount to annexa-
tion); S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1375th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2
(1967) (noting "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" in calling on
Israel to withdraw from territory it took in 1967).
7. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Israel claims sovereignty to its territory primarily on the basis of a
United Nations proposal for a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1947, the
United Nations General Assembly addressed the issue of sovereignty in
Palestine after Great Britain indicated that it planned to withdraw as the
administering power in Palestine, a role it had played since the early
1920s through a so-called "mandate" arrangement with the League of
Nations. 8
During World War I, leaders of Zionism, a movement among Euro-
pean Jews to found a Jewish state, lobbied Great Britain to sponsor such
a state in Palestine. At the time, Britain played a central role in ousting
the Ottoman Empire from Palestine. Britain said that it would promote a
"Jewish national home" in Palestine, and this ill-defined notion was writ-
ten into the League's mandate instrument. 9 Following up on this commit-
ment, Britain allowed substantial migration of Jews from Europe to
Palestine, augmenting the Jewish sector of Palestine's population, which
stood at under ten per cent as of World War I, to nearly one third by
World War II.10 The British government understood that this migration
was setting the stage for conflict, and so it sought solutions beginning in
the 1930s, but to no avail. The reason for Britain's withdrawal in 1948
was its inability to devise a system of governance acceptable to both the
Jewish and the Arab communities of Palestine.
The United Nations General Assembly, by resolution, recommended
to the Jewish and Arab communities that they split Palestine into two
states, linked by an economic union.1 In hostilities that followed the
adoption of that resolution, a Jewish state was proclaimed, and in its
founding declaration, the General Assembly resolution was cited as a
legal basis for the sovereignty of the state of Israel. 12
Under the General Assembly's proposal, Jerusalem was to form part of
neither state. Concerned that neither side would readily relinquish its
8. 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007 (1922), reprinted in Terms of League of Nations
Mandates, U.N. Doc. A/70 (1946), and in Convention between the United States and
Great Britain in Respect to Rights in Palestine, Dec. 3, 1924, 44 Stat, 2184.
9. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., supra note 8, at 1007.
10. SUPPLEMENT TO THE SURVEY OF PALESTINE 13 (reprint 1991) (1947) (estimating
99,000 Jews and 65,000 Arabs in Jerusalem as of Dec. 31, 1946).
11. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 131,139, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946) [herein-
after G.A. Res. 181].
12. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 3, 4-5 (1948); see also JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO
JUSTICE 47-53 (1990) (arguing two weaknesses in the Declaration's reliance on the General
Assembly resolution: (1) that the resolution was framed not as a disposition of territory,
but as a proposal to be implemented only if both parties could agree to it; (2) the General
Assembly had no power to dispose of territory, so that regardless of how the resolution
was framed, it did not represent a grant of territory).
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claim to the City, the Assembly advocated an internationalized status for
Jerusalem. 3 Thus, the General Assembly resolution under which Israel
claimed sovereignty over much of its territory provided no basis for a
claim to Jerusalem.
In the absence of any official claimed basis for sovereignty in Jerusa-
lem, others have formulated an argument that would support Israel's
claim. According to this argument, Great Britain's withdrawal left Pales-
tine with no sovereign, and open to occupation by others. Thus, territory
that Israel occupied in Palestine fell under its sovereignty by virtue of
occupation. 1
4
Some have contested the "void of sovereignty" argument on the
ground that no such void existed. The mandate arrangement involved a
trust relationship, in which Great Britain filled a role analogous to what,
in domestic law, would be called a trustee, while the community of citi-
zens (all citizens of Palestine, whether Arab or Jew) was the beneficial
title holder. Thus, upon Britain's departure, the previously divided title
automatically became unitary in the hands of the community of citizens.
Thus, there was no "void of sovereignty," rather the assertion of sover-
eignty by the (minority) Jewish community amounted to an infringement
on the rights of the lawful putative sovereign.
III. THE PALESTINIAN CLAIM TO JERUSALEM
The Palestinian Arabs, claim to Jerusalem is founded on their longtime
status as the majority population of Palestine. On that basis the Palestini-
ans15 claim sovereignty over all of Palestine, including Jerusalem. 16 The
Palestinians claim descendance from the Canaanites, the earliest re-
corded inhabitants of Palestine. Although political control changed
hands many times throughout history, this population, which the Arab
13. G.A. Res. 181, supra note 11, at pt. III.
14. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES 44-45 (1968); 1 D.P.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (1965); Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner:
Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279, 294 (1968); Stephen
M. Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 346 (1970).
15. The term "Palestinians" in this Article refers to the Arabs of Palestine who reside
in historic Palestine (currently Israel, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Gaza
Strip). Prior to 1948, the term was used to indicate all inhabitants of Palestine, including
Jews.
16. HENRY CATrAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 65-68 (1973) (discussing
generally the Palestinian claim to Palestine); see also Palestine National Council, Declara-
tion of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex 3 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/
43/827-S/20278 (1988) [hereinafter Palestine National Council] (declaring the creation of
an independent Palestinian Arab state with Jerusalem as its capital).
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conquest of the seventh century A.D. Arabized, remained into the twen-
tieth century.
A potential weakness in the Palestinian claim is that since 1948 the
Palestinians have not constituted the majority population in Palestine.
During the hostilities of that year, so many of them were displaced that
the population balance shifted in favor of the Jewish sector. The Pales-
tinians assert, however, that this mass wartime departure was involuntary
and does not affect their claim. 17
Another potential weakness in the Palestinian claim is that Israel also
has a claim based on occupation. Israel claims to be heir to the Hebrew
Kingdom of ancient times in Palestine. The 1948 Declaration of the Es-
tablishment of the State of Israel referred, in addition to the United Na-
tions General Assembly resolution, to "our natural and historic right" to
the territory. 18
IV. ISRAEL'S TAKING OF WEST JERUSALEM, 1948
To facilitate an assessment of the two claims to Jerusalem, this Article
turns next to facts relevant to the occupation of Palestine and to how
Israel came into control of Palestine, including Jerusalem, exploring in
turn Israel's acquisition of West Jerusalem in 1948 and of East Jerusalem
in 1967.
Until Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine began in the nine-
teenth century, Palestine's population was overwhelmingly Arab. The
Jewish migration augmented a historical Jewish minority that in the early
nineteenth century constituted two per cent of Palestine's population.
Migrating Jews settled disproportionately in urban areas; by 1900 they
made up half of Jerusalem's population, even though they still made up
only ten percent of the population of Palestine as a whole. 19
When Great Britain administered Palestine in the inter-war period,
Jewish migration from Europe gave Jews a majority in Jerusalem,
although Arabs continued to own most of the land.2" In November 1947,
after Great Britain announced its intent to withdraw from Palestine, the
United Nations General Assembly made its recommendation to divide
Palestine, with Jerusalem as a separate entity. Jerusalem was termed in
the resolution a corpus separatum, to be administered by the United Na-
17. See CAt-rAN, supra note 16, at 101-07 (discussing the involuntary nature of the
Palestinian expulsion).
18. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 4 (1948).
19. A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 916-17 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976).
20. HENRY CATrAN, JERUSALEM 158 (1981) (providing a graphic depiction of Jerusa-
lem's population).
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tions Trusteeship Council.2 ' The division of Palestine as proposed in the
resolution would have given 57% of its territory to the Jews, who made
up less than one third of its population. The Arab community reacted
negatively, in part because of the lack of proportion in the division, but
primarily because the Arab community anticipated that the end of the
mandate would bring independence to Palestine as a single unit, in which
majority rule would govern.22 In Jerusalem, in the days following the
adoption of the General Assembly resolution, the first signs of violence
between the two communities appeared.
The Arab community protested the General Assembly resolution with
commercial strikes and street demonstrations. In response, the Irgun, a
Jewish military organization, began a military campaign. "For three days,
from 11th to 13th December [1947]," wrote Irgun leader, and future
prime minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, the Irgun "hammered at con-
centrations of rioters and their offensive bases." By "rioters" Begin
meant the demonstrators. By "offensive bases," he meant Arab villages.
Of this period Begin wrote, "[w]e attacked again and again in
Jerusalem. ,23
LEHI, another Jewish military organization, one of whose leaders was
Itzhak Shamir, another future prime minister of Israel, joined the Irgun in
raiding Arab villages. In the words of a British military officer, LEHI
staged "bestial attacks on Arab villages, in which they showed not the
slightest discrimination for women and children, whom they killed as op-
portunity offered."24
In this same period, Arab irregulars, concerned that these Jewish mili-
tary forces would take over Palestine, attacked Jewish convoys bringing
supplies from the Mediterranean coast to Jewish settlements in the inte-
rior. The Haganah, a military organization affiliated with the Jewish
Agency, 25 began armed attacks on Arab villages, justifying them as repri-
sals for the convoy raids. 26 In a report from Palestine, the United States
Central Intelligence Agency called these Haganah raids "terrorist raids
21. G.A. Res. 181, supra note 11, at pt. III.
22. CATrAN, supra note 16, at 37.
23. MENACHEM BEGIN, THE REVOLT 337 (1951).
24. R.D. WILSON, CORDON AND SEARCH: WITH 6TH AIRBORNE DIVISION IN PALES-
TINE 156 (1949).
25. The Jewish Agency was the principal political organization representing the Zion-
ist movement and promoting Jewish statehood in Palestine. The United Nations accred-
ited the organization as representing the Jewish community of Palestine.
26. See NETANEL LORCH, THE EDGE OF THE SWORD: ISRAEL'S WAR OF INDEPEN-
DENCE, 1947-1949, at 59 (1961); Sam P. Brewer, Haganah Attacks a 2d Arab Village, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1947, at Al; Sam P. Brewer, Irgun Shoots Down 2 British Soldiers; Arabs
Get Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1947, at Al.
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against the Arabs similar in tactics to those of the Irgun. ' ' 27 In January
1948, the Haganah detonated a bomb killing 26 persons in an Arab neigh-
borhood of a West Jerusalem hotel. The British government called the
bombing a "dastardly and wholesale murder of innocent people.",28 Dur-
ing the same month, the.Haganah launched rockets into Arab neighbor-
hoods in Jerusalem, with the apparent aim of frightening Arab residents
into fleeing.29
Arabs did begin to evacuate Jerusalem, knowing that the Arab commu-
nity had little military capacity to protect them. In a speech in February
1948, David Ben Gurion, the Jewish Agency leader and future first prime
minister of Israel, celebrated the Arab exodus. Ben Gurion said, "[s]ince
Jerusalem's destruction in the days of the Romans it hasn't been so Jew-
ish as it is now. In many Arab districts [in West Jerusalem], one sees not
one Arab. I do not assume that this will change."3 That same month, a
Jewish woman was shot in West Jerusalem. In response, the Haganah
sent a van with a loudspeaker, ordering Arabs to abandon the
neighborhood.31
In April 1948, the Irgun and LEHI captured the village of Deir Yassin
on the western outskirts of Jerusalem and, after suppressing armed resist-
ance, killed more than 200 civilians.32 The Irgun drove survivors through
the streets of Jerusalem in trucks, in an apparent effort to frighten Jerusa-
lem's Arabs into fleeing,33 and later killed these survivors.34 The
Haganah operated loudspeaker vans in Jerusalem, announcing in Arabic,
"unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate."'35
During the spring and summer of 1948, the three Jewish military forces
took 80% of Palestine, expelling most of the Arabs from this area. By
late 1948, three quarters of a million Arabs had left Palestine, and the
27. Report by the Central Intelligence Agency: Possible Developments in Palestine, Feb.
28, 1948, 5 For. Rel. U.S. 1948 666, 672 (1976).
28. Sam P. Brewer, Britain Condemns Haganah 'Murders', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1948,
§ 1, at 1.
29. BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949,
50-52 (1987).
30. Id. at 52; see also TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS 25 (1986) (discussing Ben
Gurion's reaction to the Arab exodus).
31. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 52.
32. BEGIN, supra note 23, at 162-65 (describing the "Dir [sic] Yassin" massacre); Dana
A. Schmidt, 200 Arabs Killed, Stronghold Taken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1948, at A6.
33. HARRY LEVIN, I SAW THE BATLE OF JERUSALEM 160 (1950).
34. MICHAEL PALUMBO, THE PALESTINIAN CATASTROPHE: THE 1948 EXPULSION OF A
PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND 52 (1987); Avi SHLAIM, COLLUSION ACROSS THE JOR-
DAN 164 (1988).
35. Erskine B. Childers, The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees, in THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF PALESTINE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT 165, 186 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971).
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Arab population of Jerusalem, which at the start of the year stood at
65,000, was less than 4,000.36
After the Jewish Agency declared Jewish statehood in May 1948, Jor-
dan's army took up positions to keep the Jewish forces out of eastern
Palestine. The Israeli and Jordanian forces did not seriously contest terri-
tory generally, but around Jerusalem they fought to a standstill, leading to
the City's division. Jordan controlled the eastern sector, which included
the ancient Walled City, while Israel controlled the western sector, where
most of the City's Jews resided.
In 1950 Israel's parliament declared West Jerusalem to be Israel's capi-
tal,37 and Jordan, following a request that emerged from a meeting of
prominent Arabs,38 incorporated the West Bank, including East Jerusa-
lem. Jordan's parliament specified that it did so "without prejudicing the
final settlement of Palestine's just case within the sphere of national aspi-
rations, inter-Arab cooperation and international justice."3 9
V. ISRAEL'S TAKING OF EAST JERUSALEM, 1967
In 1967, Israel captured the eastern sector of Jerusalem when it overran
all of eastern Palestine (the West Bank of the Jordan River). This mili-
tary action resulted from military action between Israel and Egypt. Seri-
ous tension between Israel and Syria, in turn, precipitated that military
action.40
Responding to that situation, Egypt asked the United Nations to re-
move a United Nations peacekeeping force from certain sectors of the
Israel-Egypt frontier. Egypt explained that its motive in making this re-
quest was to allow it to move against Israel "the moment it [Israel] might
carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country," a reference to
36. Ian Lustick, The Quiescent Palestinians: The System of Control over Arabs in
Israel, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PALESTINIANS 64, 66 (Khalil Nakhleh & Elia Zureik
eds., 1980).
37. Emergency Regulations (Land Requisition-Accommodation of State Institutions
in Jerusalem), 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 106 (1950); see also Jerusalem Named
Capital of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1950, at Al.
38. MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1163-64 (1963).
39. Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Transjordan, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1950, § 1, at 1, 14.
40. Charles W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began, 46 FOREIGN AFF. 304, 308
(1968) (noting Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's threat to invade Syria); see Amos Sha-
pira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 ISRAEL L. REv. 65, 66 (1971) (quot-
ing the Wk. News Bull); see also Letter from George J. Tomeh, Permanent Representative
of Syria, to the President of the Security Council (May 15, 1967) reprinted in U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/7885 (1967) (complaining of Israel's threats).
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the possibility that Egypt might attack Israel if Israel attacked Syria.41
Egypt moved troops up to its frontier with Israel but made no military
move against Israel. On June 4, Israel's cabinet authorized its army to
invade Egypt.42 Israel launched that invasion the next day.43
Both Egypt and Israel claimed that the other struck first." Egypt said
that the first move was an Israeli aerial bombing of Egyptian military
aircraft on the ground at their home bases in Egypt. Israel said that the
first move was an Egyptian shelling of three southern Israeli villages and
an approach by Egyptian jet aircraft towards Israel.45 The Egyptian ver-
sion turned out to be accurate. Egypt had not shelled Israel, and Egypt's
planes never left their bases, but were destroyed there by Israel's aerial
bombardment.46
A month later, Israel's prime minister admitted that Israel struck first
but claimed it acted in "legitimate defence," expecting an imminent
Egyptian attack.47 However, other Israeli leaders who were present at
the June 4 cabinet meeting contradicted the prime minister, saying that it
was understood at the meeting that Egypt was not about to attack. 48 No
evidence came to light to suggest that Egypt was about to attack.
Jordan, which had recently entered into a defense treaty with Egypt,
shelled West Jerusalem in response to Israel's attack on Egypt. Israel
41. INDAR JIT RIKHYE, THE SINAI BLUNDER: WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE LEADING TO THE SIx-DAY WAR OF JUNE 1967, at 16 (1980) (quoting
letter from Farik Awal to the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force); see
also Report of the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency
Force, U.N. GAOR, 5th. emerg. spec. sess., para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add.2 (1967) (indi-
cating that the Secretary-General offered to move the peacekeepers from the Egyptian to
the Israeli side of the frontier, but that Israel declined).
42. Asher Wallfish, Meir Reveals Text of War Decision, JERUSALEM POST, June 5, 1972,
at 1.
43. See RITCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 180 (1984).
44. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967).
45. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (1967) (quoting
Eban's statement that "Egyptian forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding the [Is-
raeli] villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hashelosha," and "approaching Egyptian
aircraft appeared on our radar screens").
46. OVENDALE, supra note 43, at 180.
47. Admission on Attack, THE TIMES (London), July 8, 1967, at 3 (quoting statement
of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol).
48. Le gengral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 29,
1968, at 1, 4 (quoting Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin that the troops Egypt brought up to the
frontier "would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it
and we knew it.") (translated from the French original by the author); Excerpts from Begin
Speech at National Defense College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6 (quoting Prime Min-
ster Menachem Begin stating that Egypt's troop movements did "not prove that Nasser
was really about to attack us.. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack
him.").
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urged Jordan to stay out of the fighting,49 but when it did not, Israeli
troops pushed eastward through East Jerusalem to the Jordan River, oc-
cupying the entire West Bank of the Jordan River. The United Nations
Security Council, citing the prohibition against acquiring territory by mili-
tary force, asked Israel to withdraw.5"
VI. EAST JERUSALEM UNDER ISRAEL'S CONTROL
As territory taken during hostilities, the West Bank is under a regime
that in international law is termed belligerent occupation.5 Belligerent
occupation yields no sovereignty. This result follows regardless of
whether the belligerent power's use of force was aggression or lawful de-
fense. Thus, even if one were to consider Israel to have acted defensively
in its use of force against Egypt, and hence against Jordan, it would not
acquire sovereign rights in East Jerusalem.
Belligerent occupation is subject to a body of law that has developed in
the international community through the experience of warfare. A prem-
ise of the law of belligerent occupation is that the occupied territory is to
be altered as little as possible, pending a resolution of the military conflict
that precipitated the occupation, in the expectation that the belligerent
occupant will ultimately withdraw.52 One aspect of this obligation is that
the belligerent occupant must continue in force the law applicable there
at the commencement of the occupation, enacting only such regulations
as are necessary for its own protection.53
49. This warning is open to two conflicting interpretations: (1) that Israel had no intent
to take the West Bank; or (2) that Israel wanted to defeat Egypt before taking on Jordan.
Evidence for the latter is provided by the fact that after defeating both Egypt and Jordan,
Israel invaded Syria and occupied the Golan Heights.
50. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1375th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2
(1967). Simultaneously, the Council called for peace agreements between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, apparently making the two actions dependent on each other. The linkage
does not derogate from the point made in the text, which is that the Council did not view
Israel as having any right to the territory it seized during the 1967 hostilities.
51. S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc S/INF/36 (1981). Resolution 465 does not use the term
"belligerent occupant," but uses the term "occupied" and states that the Geneva Conven-
tion relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which is a convention on
belligerent occupation, provides the applicable law. The term "belligerent" appears in arti-
cle 4 of the Geneva Convention and is commonly used to describe the status of territory to
which the Geneva Convention applies. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950)
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]; see also JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 111-15 (1987); Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the Interna-
tional Status of Jerusalem, in 3 THE PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31
(1986).
52. See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 223-24 (1959).
53. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43; 1 BEVANS,
[Vol. 45:765
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In the bulk of the West Bank, Israel enforced Jordanian law, but for
East Jerusalem, Israel's parliament, the Knesset, applied Israeli law to the
exclusion of Jordanian law. The Knesset did so by legislating that "[t]he
law, jurisdiction and administration of the State [of Israel] shall extend to
any area of Eretz Israel54 designated by the Government by order."55
By another law, the Knesset authorized the Minister of the Interior to
extend the boundaries of any municipality to include the area that gov-
ernment order designated,56 and the Minister expanded the borders of
East Jerusalem to include a substantial sector of the West Bank.57 The
government then merged East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem to form a
single administrative entity.58
Israel was careful to specify that these enactments did not amount to a
claim of sovereignty over East Jerusalem. It told the United Nations:
"The measures adopted relate to the integration of Jerusalem in the ad-
ministrative and municipal spheres, and furnish a legal basis for the pro-
tection of the Holy Places of Jerusalem." 9 The United Nations,
however, condemned Israel for these laws and decrees, finding them to
effect an annexation of East Jerusalem in all but name.6"
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1776-1949, at 631 (1968). Geneva Convention, supra note 51, art. 64.
54. The term "Eretz Israel" (Land of Israel) means the territory of mandate Palestine,
which includes the West Bank.
55. Law and Administration Ordinance Law, (Amendment No. 11) Law, 21 LAWS OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 75 (1967). Implementing this law, the government ordered that
Israeli law should apply. Kovetz HaTakanot (Official Gazette), No. 2064, June 28, 1967, at
2690, reprinted in Sabri Jiryis, Israeli Laws as Regards Jerusalem, in IV THE LEGAL As-
PECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSA-
LEM 181, 182 (Hans Kochler ed., 1981).
56. Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law, 21 LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 75 (1967).
57. Kovetz HaTakanot (Official Gazette), No. 2063, June 28, 1967, at 2670.
58. Municipalities Ordinance (Declaration on the Enlargement of Jerusalem's City Lim-
its), Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazette), No. 2065, June 28, 1967, at 2694, reprinted in
Order Unites Holy City, JERUSALEM POST. June 29, 1967, at 1.
59. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg. Spec. Sess., at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/6753 at 3 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 846 (letter of Abba Eban, Foreign Minister,
to U.N. Secretary-General).
60. S.C. Res. 267, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., 1485th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. SINF/24/Rev.1
(1969) (expressing concern and condemnation of Israel's action); S.C. Res. 252, U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess., 1421st mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968) (declaring invalid
those actions changing the status of Jerusalem); G.A. Res. 2253, U.N. GAOR, 5th Emerg.
Spec. Sess., at 234, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967) (declaring Israel's actions invalid); see also
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 59 (quoting Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba
Eban, as stating in letter to the Secretary-General that the term, "annexation" was "out of
place").
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In 1980, however, the Knesset passed a law stating that "Jerusalem,
complete and united" was "the capital of Israel."'6' This enactment by
implication claimed sovereignty over both sectors of Jerusalem. 62 The
United Nations found this law, like the 1967 measures, to be unlawful, as
an attempted annexation of territory under belligerent occupation.63
All this time Jordan still claimed sovereignty in the West Bank, includ-
ing East Jerusalem. In 1988, however, after the Palestine National Coun-
cil declared a Palestine state, Jordan renounced its claim.' The Palestine
National Council proclaimed "the establishment of the State of Palestine
in the land of Palestine with its capital at Jerusalem, ' '65 the state to en-
compass the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.66
Israel, however, continued to claim East Jerusalem. In 1990, after a
shooting incident in East Jerusalem in which Israeli police killed seven-
teen Palestinians, the United Nations Security Council, acting on the
premise that East Jerusalem was under belligerent occupation, asked the
United Nations Secretary-General to propose appropriate measures in
response. 67 The Secretary-General proposed sending investigators, but
Israel objected, saying, "Jerusalem is not, in any part, 'occupied territory';
it is the sovereign capital of the State of Israel. Therefore, there is no
room for any involvement on the part of the United Nations in any mat-
ter relating to Jerusalem. '68 In a follow-up resolution, the Security Coun-
cil expressed "alarm" at Israel's view that East Jerusalem was not
occupied territory.69
61. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 209
(1980).
62. Sce Temple Mount Faithful Association v. Attorney General, High Court 4185/90,
47(5) Piskei Din 221 (1993) (ruling, on basis of 1980 Act, that East Jerusalem is under
Israel's sovereignty); Asher F. Landau, Israel's Rights on Temple Mount Undisputed, JERU-
SALEM POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at 7 (summarizing Temple Mount case).
63. S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2245th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36
(1980); G.A. Res. 35/169E, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 208-09, U.N. Doc. A/
35/48 (1981).
64. John Kifner, Internal Tensions: King Warns Palestinians Residing in Jordan to
Maintain Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at Al (King Hussein announcing, "We re-
spect the wish of the P.L.O .... [for] an independent Palestinian state")..
65. Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, supra note 16, at 15.
66. Letter from Deputy Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization
to the Secretary General, in U.N. GAOR. 43d Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 37 at 7, U.N.
Doc. A/43/827, S/20278 (1988).
67. S.C. Res. 672, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1991).
68. Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in Accordance
with Resolution 672, U.N. SCOR 3, U.N. Doc. S/21919 (1990).
69. S.C. Res. 673, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2949 mtg. at Res. & Dec. 7, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/46 (1991); see also Joel Brinkley, Labor Party Rejects Likud Terms for Palestinian
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1990, at A3 (objecting to Israel's plans to build housing in East
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Beginning in 1967, in East Jerusalem, the Israeli government confis-
cated land and constructed residential housing for Jews. This phenome-
non continued even after Israel and the PLO agreed, in their 1993
Declaration of Principles, to resolve the status of Jerusalem in the context
of their so-called permanent status negotiations, to commence in 1996.70
In 1995, after Israel announced a plan to expropriate additional land in
East Jerusalem to build housing for Jews, only a United States veto
stopped the Security Council from condemning the proposed action.7'
An Israeli civil rights organization charged that Israel's policy was to cre-
ate "a demographic and geographic reality that will preempt every future
effort to question Israeli sovereignty in East [sic] Jerusalem. '72
During the Security Council debate, the United Kingdom delegate said
that Israel should "refrain from taking actions which seek to change the
status quo on this most sensitive of all issues before the conclusion of the
final-status negotiations."73
VII. SOVEREIGNTY IN JERUSALEM
States recognizing Israel have not recognized Israeli sovereignty over
either the western or eastern sector of Jerusalem, despite nearly half a
century of Israeli control in West Jerusalem, and nearly thirty years in
East Jerusalem.74 Regarding West Jerusalem, states maintaining diplo-
matic relations with Israel have avoided locating their embassies there,
placing them instead in Tel Aviv, precisely because they consider the sta-
Jerusalem for newly arriving immigrants from the Soviet Union, the U.S. Department of
State reaffirmed that East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank, not of Israel).
70. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
1, art. 5 § 2.
71. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3538 (1995); see also,
Barbara Crossette, U.S. Vetoes Condemnation In U.N. of Israeli Land Seizure, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1995, at A10.
72. B'tselem, A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and Building
in East Jerusalem 1 (typescript edition, 1995); see also Suspension of Land Expropriations:
Rabin Holds News Conference on Land Expropriation Decision (Israel Defense Force Ra-
dio, Tel Aviv, May 22, 1995) (transcript in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World Library, Curnws File) (announcing that
Israel would "suspend" expropriations but avoiding a commitment not to resume).
73. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV/3538 (1995) (quoting Sir
David Hannay, U.K.); see also id. at 3 (Mr. Lavrov, Russian Federation); id. at 4 (Mr.
Wisnumurti, Indonesia); id. at 5 (Mr. Fulci, Italy); id. at 8 (Mr. Mdrimde, France) (all as-
serting that the 1995 land seizures were intended to preempt the Palestinian claim of sover-
eignty in East Jerusalem).
74. See Harry N. Howard, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part 11, 30 DEP'T ST. BULL., March 1954, at 328-29
(quoting U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles); Shlomo Slonim, The United States and the
Status of Jerusalem 1947-1984, 19 ISRAEL L. REV. 179, 195-97, 202 (1984).
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tus of Jerusalem to be undetermined. As for East Jerusalem, objection to
Israel's control is exhibited through collective criticism of Israel at the
United Nations.
To assert its legitimacy in Palestine, Israel relies primarily on the 1947
General Assembly resolution, but this resolution yields no argument for
sovereignty in Jerusalem,75 since the resolution proposed international-
ization. The "void of sovereignty" argument proffered to support Israeli
sovereignty in Jerusalem is based on a premise that the territory is res
nullius, i.e., without a sovereign.76 That premise was not true, however.
There was no void of sovereignty in Palestine because, during the man-
date period, the community of citizens of Palestine held sovereignty sub-
ject to Great Britian's administration.77 A community under a League
mandate was deemed to be a subject of international law with a legal
interest in the territory that was separate from that of the mandatory
power.78 In Palestine under the mandate, the inhabitants carried Pales-
tine citizenship.79 When Britain withdrew, the community of citizens was
entitled to exercise its latent sovereignty. The majority of that commu-
nity of citizens was represented by a United Nations recognized political
organization, the Arab Higher Committee, which asserted a right to es-
tablish a government for Palestine.
Separate from rights stemming from the mandate arrangement, the
community of citizens of Palestine enjoyed a right to sovereignty by vir-
tue of the self-determination principle.8 0  The analysis the International
Court of Justice used in the Western Sahara case would lead to a conclu-
sion that the community of citizens of Palestine, predominantly Arab, but
with a Jewish minority, had a right to sovereignty based on its connection
to the territory, and on the principle of self-determination.8' Under that
75. G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d sess., 1947, at 131-51; John Quigley Old Jeru-
salem: Whose to Govern?, 20 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 155-56 (1991).
76. Lapidoth, supra note 2, at 412-14; JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL & PALESTINE: ASSAULT
ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 116-18 (1981); supra note 14 and textual discussion (discussing
theory that when Britain pulled out territory occupied by Israel was under its sovereignty
by virtue of occupation).
77. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. supra note 8, at 1007.
78. See James B. Scott, The Two Institutes of International Law, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 87,
91 (1932) (quoting part of a 1931 resolution of the Institute of International Law).
79. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., supra note 8, at 1008; Palestine Citizenship Order in
Council, July 24, 1925, Statutory Rules & Orders, no. 777, at 474 (1925); Norman Bentwich,
Nationality in Mandated Territories Detached from Turkey, THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 102 (1926); The International Status of Palestine, 90 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 964, 966 (1963).
80. Quigley, supra note 75 at 155-57.
81. Western Sahara, (advisory opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 3, 31-33, 40-68; supra note 18 and
accompanying text (Israel claimed historic right to territory).
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analysis, an Israeli claim based on the Hebrew Kingdom of ancient times
would not prevail, because the more substantial contact with the territory
was that of the predominantly Arab community of citizens. By forcibly
taking Jerusalem in 1948 and 1967, Israel prevented the community of
citizens of Palestine from exercising its sovereignty.
The Jewish community, to be sure, constituted the majority population
of Jerusalem at the end of World War II. But it was the community of
citizens of the territory of Palestine that had a right to exercise sover-
eignty, regardless of which group predominated in a particular locality.
The claim to sovereignty of the community of citizens as it existed in
1948 is not undermined by the fact that the population mix changed radi-
cally in that year.82 A right to sovereignty is not lost because of wartime
displacement. The United Nations has long taken the view that the Pales-
tinians displaced in 1948 are entitled to return.83 It has taken this view
whenever faced with a situation of displacement by civil warfare; rou-
tinely calling for the repatriation of refugees. 84 Those displaced Palestini-
ans and their progeny are entitled to return, a matter that Israel and the
PLO have agreed to address in the "permanent status" negotiations,
along with the question of the status of Jerusalem.85 They are part of the
population bearing sovereign rights.
The above analysis applies to both sectors of Jerusalem. Regarding the
eastern sector, it was indicated above that Israel acted aggressively, but
82. Lustick, supra note 36, at 66.
83. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 186th plen. mtg. at para. 11, U.N Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 85 (1973).
84. See S.C. Res. 779, U.N. Doc. S/RES/779 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.N.Y.B. 343
(regarding Croatia, "all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former
homes"); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.N.Y.B. 375 (re-
garding Bosnia, the Council "insists that all displaced persons be enabled to return in
peace to their former homes"); S.C. Res. 876, U.N. Doc. S/RES/876 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.N.Y.B. 510 (regarding Abkhazia, affirms "right of refugees and displaced persons
to return to their homes"); S.C. Res. 1009, 3563d mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1009 (1995) (de-
manded that Croatia "in conformity with internationally recognized standards ... respect
fully the rights of the local Serb population including their rights to remain, leave or return
in safety... [and] create conditions conducive to the return of those persons who have left
their homes"); S.C. Res. 1019, 3591st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (1995) (demanded that
Croatia "respect fully the rights of the local Serb population including their right to remain
or return in safety" and called on Croatia "to lift any time-limits placed upon the return of
refugees to Croatia to reclaim their property"); Security Council Fails to Reconfirm Resolu-
tions Regulating Transport of Goods Between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Federal News Service, Dec. 5, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File (quotes Security Council statement of that date in which Council "reaffirm[ed]
the right of all refugees and displaced persons affected by the conflict to return to their
homes in secure conditions in accordance with international law").
85. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra note
1, art. V §§ 2, 3.
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that fact is not determinative regarding sovereignty.86 Israel would
equally have deprived the rightful sovereign of the territory of East Jeru-
salem had it acted defensively.87 The United Nations Charter recognized
a right to use force in self-defense, but only for the limited purpose of
repelling aggression.88 A state that occupies territory while acting in its
defense does not thereby gain sovereignty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The international community should promote for Jerusalem a solution
consistent with the legitimate claims of the contending parties. From the
standpoint of territorial right, as this notion is understood in international
law, Palestine has a valid claim to Jerusalem. That does not mean that it
could not agree to a solution whereby the City would be international-
ized, or whereby it would be divided or controlled jointly. Jerusalem is
one issue among several to be resolved between Palestine and Israel, and
the parties are free to make concessions on one issue in order to gain an
advantage on another.
The danger in the current situation is that while legal entitlement fa-
vors the PLO, de facto control rests with Israel, and Israel enjoys a pre-
ponderance of military and political power relative to the PLO.
Moreover, even since 1991, when the negotiation process began, and
since 1993, when Israel agreed to resolve the issue of Jerusalem, Israel
has continued to take land in Jerusalem and insert more of its own citi-
zens in an apparent effort to create a situation that will not be reversed.
A solution for Jerusalem that ignores legal entitlement runs the risk of
sowing the seeds of new conflict, rather than bringing long-term peace.
To be sure, a solution for Jerusalem in accord with principle will anger
many Jews, particularly those of the political right. In the long term,
however, a solution that follows principle holds greater prospect of pro-
viding a lasting peace. The international community has a role to ensure
an equitable solution. If an inequitable solution is reached, the decades
of hostility in the region will not end.
86. OVENDALE, supra note 43, at 180.
87. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
88. Id.
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